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CLOSING THE FLOODGATES: MAKING
PERSUASIVE POLICY ARGUMENTS IN
APPELLATE BRIEFS
Ellie Margolis*
I. INTRODUCTION 1
"For reasons of public policy, this Court should. .
As teachers of legal writing,2 how often have we seen
arguments in student briefs that start out this way and continue
by making some generalized statements asserting that the
desired legal rule will serve a social or economic good? Student
arguments of this type rarely identify which "public policy" is
being asserted or discuss specifically how the proposed rule will
advance that policy. These arguments are rarely supported by
authority, and are rarely persuasive unless the reader is already
inclined to agree with the position taken. The arguments
usually sound as if they are written off the top of the writer's
head, rather than the product of carefully researched and
thought-out analysis. These are not effective policy arguments,
and many legal writing teachers recognize this. 3
* Associate Professor of Law, The James E. Beasley School of Law at Temple
University. B.A., Wesleyan University 1987; J.D. Northeastern University School of
Law, 1990. This article is based on a presentation at the Legal Writing Institute
Conference, July 20, 2000. The author would like to thank her colleagues on the legal
writing faculty at Temple University: Jan Levine, Susan DeJarnatt, Kristin Gerdy, and
Kathryn Stanchi for their ongoing support of her work. Special thanks also to Mark
Nebrig for his excellent research assistance. This article was supported by a grant from
the Beasley School of Law.
1. Although the focus of this article is on student writing and teaching students to
make effective policy arguments, many practicing attorneys fall victim to the same
errors in making vague, unsupported policy arguments or relying solely on discussions of
policy in reported cases in appellate briefs. See generally Ellie Margolis, Beyond
Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L.
REV. 197 (2000).
2. "Legal writing" refers to the combination of legal research, analysis, writing
and advocacy that most law school programs offer. See RALPH L. BRILL ET AL.,
SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS 1 (ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar 1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
3. The author has questioned many legal writing teachers about whether they
1
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It is no wonder, however, that students do not make
effective policy arguments since, for the most part, they are not
taught to do so. For most students, the introduction to policy-
based reasoning occurs in doctrinal courses such as contracts
and torts.4 In these courses, students focus on discerning the
underlying policy in a particular judicial decision or body of law.
Many legal writing programs pick up on this and teach students
how to identify the underlying policy of an existing rule and
show how that policy applies to a particular fact pattern or
client situation.5 This type of policy-based reasoning, however,
is only a sub-part of the skill of making policy arguments which
a student should learn in order to become an effective advocate.
An equally important part of the skill of policy
argumentation is implicated when the advocate is urging a court
to adopt a particular legal rule for a new situation, rather than
simply applying an existing rule to a set of facts. 6 This type of
argument is particularly important in appellate brief-writing,
where advocates frequently address novel issues of law.7 This
kind of policy argumentation is an important skill which is
generally not taught in law school legal writing programs.
Although many of the legal writing and appellate advocacy
textbooks mention policy arguments, none of them have any
specific discussion of how to effectively make those arguments.8
think their students make effective policy arguments, particularly in appellate briefs.
The most common response is frustration that students don't seem to fully understand
what a policy argument is and how to make one effectively. The "for reasons of public
policy" opening is commonly lamented as a universal problem.
4. For a more detailed discussion of how policy is discussed in law school, see
James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1021, 1055-60
(1985) (discussing the use of policy in teaching a torts class); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom
and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 533-
35 (1986) [hereinafter Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint] (reviewing the "typical" policy
arguments); DUNCAN KENNEDY, Legal Education as Training for Heirarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 54, 59 (David Kairys, ed., 3d ed., Basic Books 1998) [hereinafter
KENNEDY, Training for Hierarchy] (critiquing the "formulaic, pro/con policy arguments"
that first-year students learn in their doctrinal classes).
5. Most of the legal writing textbooks cover this type of policy argument. See, e.g.,
LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING - PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 107 (2d
ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 1999) [hereinafter EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING]; RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 131 (3d ed., Aspen L. & Bus.
1998); DIANA V. PRATT, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 325 (3d ed., West
1999); HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 44 (4th ed. 1999).
6. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between arguing the policy of
an existing rule and arguing policy for a new rule, see Margolis, supra note 1, at 211-13.
7. Id. at 219.
8. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL (Revised 1st ed., NITA
1996) (no specific discussion of policy arguments); CAROLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIVE
2
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It is time for legal writing professionals to take up the task of
teaching students to make sound, persuasive policy arguments.
There are many obstacles to the teaching of effective policy
argumentation. Most teachers of legal writing, like our
students, had no exposure to this type of analysis in law school.
Many of us probably see policy as unimportant, or so "mushy" as
not to serve an important role in appellate argument. In
addition, there are very few sources to which we can turn to
educate ourselves about effective policy arguments. As noted
above, legal writing textbooks have only a cursory treatment of
this subject if they cover it at all.9 There is virtually no
scholarly treatment of the subject.10 Likewise, there is very
little discussion of policy arguments in practitioner-oriented
publications that address making policy arguments." Finally,
there are very few good examples of policy arguments in
appellate briefs submitted to courts.12
This article is an attempt to review the information that
would be useful to a legal writing teacher who is interested in a
more thoughtful, deliberate teaching of policy arguments. Policy
argumentation is an important skill which should be taught in
law school legal writing programs. 13 Not only should we teach
students that policy arguments are an important advocacy tool,
APPELLATE ADVOCACY: BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 100 (West 1998) (general
explanation of equity and policy arguments); EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING, supra note 5, at
107 (discussing policy-based reasoning, but no discussion of how to make policy
arguments); NEUMANN, supra note 5, at 271-72 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the importance
of policy arguments, but not how to support them); LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL., THE
LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 61-62 (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 1998) (listing policy as a
"type" of argument with no explanation of what a policy argument is); DIANA V. PRATT,
supra note 5, at 320-26 (discussing policy arguments and sources for support, but no
specific explanation of how to put together); SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 198-202
(section discusses types of policy argument, but not how to support them).
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10. Extensive research revealed very little on the subject of policy arguments or
how to support them. The works of Critical Legal Studies scholars such as Duncan
Kennedy and James Boyle, supra note 4, discuss the nature and types of policy
argument, but do not address the practical realities of constructing these arguments.
The author's previous work, supra note 1, is the only article which specifically discusses
how to support policy arguments.
11. Margolis, supra note 1, at 200-01.
12. A review of over 150 party briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court in
the last 10 years revealed fewer than 20 briefs that contained identifiable policy
arguments. Of these, not all were clearly supported or made effectively.
13. As indicated above, this is a skill which is best taught in the context of
appellate advocacy. The author leaves open, for the moment, whether this skill is best
taught in a first-year moot court program, or in an advanced writing or appellate
advocacy course.
3
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we should also teach them specifically what policy arguments
are and how to construct and support these arguments in
writing. Part Two of this article begins by reviewing the reasons
why making policy arguments is a specific and distinct skill
which should be taught. Part Three categorizes and explains
the different types of policy arguments. Finally, Part Four
discusses how to support policy arguments with authority to
make them effective and persuasive.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF TEACHING POLICY ARGUMENTATION AS
A SKILL
A critical part of teaching students to be lawyers includes
teaching them legal analysis, or "thinking like a lawyer." To do
this, students must learn specific skills. 14 The goal of a legal
writing program should be to teach students how to "think,
write and speak 'like a lawyer."' 15  This includes many
individual skills, including legal research, clear expression and
style, drafting the types of documents legal writing students are
likely to write as lawyers, and, most importantly, using legal
analysis, reasoning, and advocacy to solve legal problems. 16
This last category can broadly be called "legal analysis" and is
arguably the most important of the skills.
Inherent in legal analysis are a number of sub-skills which
should be taught in a legal writing course. Specifically, students
should learn how to apply a rule from a single case to a set of
facts, synthesize a rule from a body of cases and apply it to facts,
draw an analogy to a precedent case, apply a rule from a statute
or regulation, argue that existing precedent dictates the
adoption of a particular legal rule, and argue that policy
considerations support the adoption of a particular legal rule.17
Most legal writing programs do an admirable job of teaching
each of these skills, with the glaring exception of the last one.
There are many possible reasons for this. Most legal
writing teachers learn about policy in doctrinal law courses
where we are presented with "a list of balanced, formulaic,
pro/con policy arguments that lawyers use in arguing that a
14. Paul Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis". A Systematic Approach, 40
U. MIAMi L. REV. 409, 429-31 (1986) (identifying six skills necessary to mastering legal
analysis: the use of facts, statutes, synthesis, analogies, policy, and apparent
contradiction).
15. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 5.
16. Id. at 5-7.
17. Id. at 18-19.
Vol. 62
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given rule should apply to a situation in spite of a gap, conflict
or ambiguity or that a given case should be extended or
narrowed."' 8 These arguments come in "matched contrary pairs,
like certainty vs. flexibility, security vs. freedom of action,
property as incentive to labor vs. property as incipient
monopoly, no liability without fault vs. as between two innocents
he who caused the damage should pay, the supremacy clause vs.
local initiative, and so on."19 This teaches us that policy reasons
can be advanced to support any side or outcome in a dispute.
We get the message that policy is an amorphous concept, more
useful for understanding a decision after the fact than for
predicting or advocating a particular outcome.
With this view of policy argumentation, it is no wonder that
law school legal writing programs provide only a cursory,
general introduction to the use of policy in brief writing.20 There
is another approach to teaching policy, however, which is more
consistent with legal writing pedagogy, and which provides a
clearer understanding of how policy can be used in the real
world of law practice. This approach focuses on the "use" of
policy rather than its "discovery."2' Instead of trying to discern
how policy considerations affected a particular decision,
students should be taught to understand the nature of different
types of policy arguments and how an understanding of policy
can affect the way a legal problem is viewed. This will allow
students to make choices about "what policy argument best
supports a particular side in a particular dispute."22
This approach is most consistent with the way lawyers
actually use policy when representing clients. A person using
this approach does not assume that there is an objectively
correct policy which requires a particular outcome, but rather,
that in a particular case, involving particular facts, there is a
policy consideration that benefits one party more than the
other. 23 Thus, instead of encouraging students to find the
"correct" policy, this approach encourages students to find the
18. KENNEDY, Training for Hierarchy, supra note 4, at 59.
19. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 4, at 534.
20. The author recognizes that there are probably many individual legal writing
professors who give more instruction in policy argumentation than is found in the text
books. This article is not meant as a critique of legal writing programs. Rather, it is an
attempt to provide some useful information for those who are interested in a more
systematic way of teaching or using this skill.
21. Wangerin, supra note 14, at 456.
22. Id.
23. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 4, at 534-35.
2001
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policy that best advances their hypothetical client's interests.
Because this approach has more of a "real-world" feel, students
are more likely to be motivated to grasp this skill and learn
what policy analysis is about.24
This approach is similar to the way most legal writing
programs teach case analysis. Rather than reading cases
primarily to figure out what they mean, which is the approach
taken most often in doctrinal courses, legal writing students
generally read cases to determine their use in solving fact-based
problems.25 The latter approach focuses on cases as a tool,
rather than as an end in themselves. Using this approach, legal
writing professors encourage students to articulate a rule from a
case, or synthesize a rule from a group of cases, in a way that
benefits their hypothetical client.26  For example, in some
situations a narrow, fact-based statement of the rule may be
beneficial to a client presenting a situation similar to that in the
reported case.27 In other situations, a more abstract articulation
of the rule might allow the client to assert that the rule applies
to a different fact scenario. 28 The ability to use cases in different
ways is a crucial skill, particularly for persuasive writing such
as is necessary in an appellate brief.29 Students generally
recognize that this is a valuable skill they will need in practice
and, as a result, struggle to master it.
Using the same approach to teach policy argumentation,
then, has a double benefit. First, it is consistent with the other
skills students learn in legal writing, thus the method will be
familiar and students will have an easier time grasping the
often complex concepts involved in policy argumentation.
Second, because the approach will help students realize the real-
world implications of using policy arguments to benefit a client's
position, they will respond more positively and make a greater
effort to understand the nature of policy arguments. 30 Ideally,
24. Wangerin, supra note 14, at 456.
25. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 6.
26. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 5, at 275-76; OATES ET AL., supra note 8, at 315.
27. SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 186-87
28. Id.
29. This is particularly true when an appeal raises an issue of first impression for
which there is no binding authority. The author uses an appellate brief problem that
raises an issue of first impression for the express purpose of giving the students the
experience of using cases that could arguably support a result for either party. Many
other legal writing professors use similar problems, as evidenced by a review of Idea
Bank submissions for the 1998 Legal Writing Institute Conference.
30. Wangerin, supra note 14, at 456.
Vol. 62
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this will lead to more effective use of policy both in students'
work during law school and in their work as practicing
attorneys.
Why is teaching students to effectively use policy
important? Because policy can play an extremely important role
in judicial decision-making, particularly when a court must
resolve a novel issue or develop a new rule of law.31 The
renowned judge Benjamin Cardozo recognized this in his famous
book, The Nature of the Judicial Process,32 asserting that to
address novel issues of law, judges must turn to "public policy,
the good of the collective body."33 Judges today recognize that
public policy is still an important part of judicial decision-
making.34
Policy can play a role in almost any case, but policy plays an
especially important role in three types of cases: common law
cases of first impression, constitutional cases raising novel
application of constitutional provisions, and cases of first-time
statutory interpretation. 35 In these cases, there is no explicitly
binding authority which directs the court to act in a particular
manner. Instead, the court must create new law, assuming a
"legislative" function.3 6  When faced with these situations,
judges may employ a variety of approaches, including reasoning
based on precedent, principle, and policy.37 When judges rely on
policy-based reasoning, however, they often base their reasoning
on intuition or experience, rather than on a well-researched
argument. 38
A lawyer writing a brief should be apprehensive about
31. Margolis, supra note 1, at 219.
32. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
33. Id. at 72.
34. Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Brennan Legacy: The Art of Judging, 32 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 673, 677 (1999) (a central tenet of modem jurisprudence is that "[judges should
consider the effect of their judicial decisions on society and social welfare, rather than
adhering solely to a mechanical jurisprudence of legal conceptions); Judith S. Kaye, State
Courts and the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) (state court judges, when dealing with
issues of first impression or filling in gaps, "are frequently left to choose among
competing policies").
35. For a full review of these types of cases and why policy plays a critical role, see
Margolis, supra note 1, at 219-32 (asserting that the American common law method
creates gaps in the law which must be filled, even in cases involving statutes or other
positive law, and that filling gaps is most often done with policy).
36. Id. at 197.
37. Id. at 211.
38. Id. at 221 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little
Brown & Co. 1990) (1881)).
2001
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relying on a judge's intuition about public policy. A lawyer
writing a brief in a case in which policy is likely to be a factor
should make a sound, well-researched, and effective policy
argument in the brief, just as she should make sound, well-
researched and effective legal arguments. 39 In legal writing, we
teach students to write briefs that precisely explain how a case
supports a particular point. We emphasize the importance of
presenting a case from the client's viewpoint, rather than letting
the judge read the law and decide how it applies. 40 We should
do the same with policy, encouraging students to make effective
policy arguments from the client's viewpoint to back up their
legal arguments in appropriate cases.
In addition to policy as an important part of legal decision-
making, students should learn to make effective policy
arguments because these arguments can greatly enhance the
persuasive value of a brief. Policy arguments go beyond the rule
or holding of a particular case, appealing to the broad interests
of lay people as well as judges.41 Policy arguments are most
often arguments about the way the world works, or arguments
that a proposed rule will benefit society or serve a useful social
function.42 Because policy arguments are broad in nature, they
can often apply to more than one specific legal issue within the
same case.43 This is important because most cases on appeal
involve multiple legal issues. A policy theme which unifies
multiple issues in a case can make the brief as a whole much
more compelling and persuasive.44
Used in this way, a policy argument can function much like
a theory of the case, a concept taught in most legal writing and
appellate advocacy courses. 45  A theory of the case is the
framework, or lens, through which the attorney presents the
client's position to the court. A sound theory should unify all of
39. In Beyond Brandeis, the author suggests that an attorney may, in fact, have an
ethical obligation to make such arguments and support them with all available sources
of authority, both legal and non-legal. Margolis, supra note 1, at 206.
40. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING, supra note 5, at 307; NEUMANN, supra note 5, at
276-77.
41. Wangerin, supra note 14, at 457.
42. Margolis, supra note 1, at 211 (citing Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of
Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7, 10
(1996) [hereinafter Edwards, Convergence]).
43. Wangerin, supra note 14, at 457.
44. Id. at 458.
45. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 5, at 257; SHAPO ETAL., supra note 5, at 281.
Vol. 62
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the facts and legal arguments into a cohesive whole. 46 Likewise,
a sound, well thought-out policy argument can serve the same
purpose and be a powerful force in demonstrating to a judge that
a particular outcome is both legally correct and just.
A good example of this can be seen in the appellate brief
problem the author uses in the first-year legal writing course at
Temple University.47  The problem involves whether a
psychiatrist has a duty to warn potential victims of a dangerous
mental patient when the patient specifically threatened these
individuals and the psychiatrist has reason to believe the
patient will carry out the threats.4 The problem is set in
Georgia, where this is an issue of first impression. 49 There are
two main legal issues involved in the resolution of this problem:
first, whether there is support in Georgia's common law for
imposing such a tort law duty; and second, whether the
psychiatrist-patient confidentiality statute, which is very strict
in Georgia, prohibits the court from imposing such a duty.
There is no precedent directly on point in Georgia, however,
there is related precedent that could support an outcome in
favor of either the psychiatrist or the victims.
There are several ways that policy can come into play for
both parties in this dispute. For the victims, who want the court
to impose a duty to warn, the obvious policy argument would be
public safety, a social policy argument.50 The victims can
construct an argument that points to the high value society
places on public safety. They can point to various sources,
including the state constitution, which emphasize the value of
public safety and the role of law in promoting it. They could also
46. NEUMANN, supra note 5, at 257.
47. At the James E. Beasley School of Law at Temple University, the final
memorandum assignment from the fall semester is converted into an appellate brief
problem in the spring semester. In the fall, the problem is set in a pre-litigation posture
in which students explore the likelihood of their client's success if the case were to be
filed (students are assigned to represent one or the other of the potential parties). This
allows us to use a more complex problem, since students are able to get a solid grasp on
the basic legal issues before they become advocates for one side or the other on appeal.
See JAN M. LEVINE, LEGAL RESEARCH & WRITING I COURSE MATERIALS 3 (1999/2000).
48. This problem originally appeared in JAN M. LEVINE, ANALYTICAL ASSIGNMENTS
FOR INTEGRATING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING (1st ed. 1991). Subsequent editions
were published in 1993, 1995, and 1996. Kathryn A. Sampson co-authored the 1995 and
1996 editions.
49. For ease of discussion, the author is going to present the problem in general
terms, without citation to authority.
50. For a more detailed discussion of the different types of policy arguments, see
infra Section III.
2001
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use available psychiatric or sociological data demonstrating that
having a psychiatrist issue a warning under these circumstances
benefits the patient and promotes public safety. In this way, the
victims can create a compelling argument that the court should
resolve the case in favor of this compelling policy.
In addition, the victims can use the public safety policy to
unify the legal arguments which must inevitably be a part of the
court's decision. 51 The victims can present the common law in
light of the policy value of public safety, showing that Georgia
precedent consistently recognizes this value in determining tort
liability. Likewise, the victims can show that the Georgia code
reflects the importance of public safety. The victims can show
the legislature recognizes the value of public safety through the
confidentiality statute, in conjunction with related statutes on
civil commitment and disclosure of certain communicable
diseases. Thus, a ruling in the victim's favor would be
consistent with legislative intent. In this way, the victims can
unify all of the individual arguments in the brief into a
persuasive whole.
The psychiatrist has two very different policy options. The
psychiatrist's goal is to have the court reject a duty to warn and
maintain the status quo. One policy approach that supports this
goal is an "institutional competence" argument. 52  The
psychiatrist could argue that this is an issue more properly
addressed in the state legislature. To support this policy
argument, the psychiatrist could cite theoretical and empirical
data on the importance of confidentiality in the
psychiatrist/patient relationship and the ability of psychiatrists
to accurately predict dangerousness, to demonstrate the
complexity of the issues and urge that the legislature is better
suited to consider and balance all of the complex factors involved
in adopting a duty to warn. Under this approach, the
psychiatrist would avoid judging the social value of a duty to
warn. Rather, the psychiatrist would be urging the court to
defer to the legislature's judgment of the issue. Thus, the
institutional competence policy would unify both the common
law and statutory arguments.
Like the victims, the psychiatrist could use this approach to
51. While policy arguments can be very important, most courts still rely primarily
on conventional legal arguments to justify their decisions. Michael C. Doff, Foreword:
The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 41-42 (1998).
52. For a more detailed discussion of the different types of policy arguments, see
infra Section III.
Vol. 62
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unify his legal arguments. He could use the fact that there is no
common law precedent beyond a psychiatrist's duty to control a
dangerous patient to argue that the court has gone as far as it
can without acting "as a legislature." He could use the
confidentiality statute and the detailed exceptions for things like
civil commitment to argue that this issue is already in the
legislative arena and should stay there.
The psychiatrist could also take a completely different
approach and make a social policy argument asserting that a
duty to warn would dangerously undermine the psychiatrist-
patient relationship, lead to poor mental health treatment, and
ultimately have a negative effect on the public health and
welfare. Under this approach, the psychiatrist would make a
direct attack on the duty to warn itself. To unify the legal
arguments, the psychiatrist would focus on the substance of the
common law and statutory provisions, showing that they have
stopped where they have for sound reasons, and arguing that
the court should not undermine those reasons now.
Thus, policy arguments can have a profound impact on the
overall persuasive value of a brief. If, as in the example above,
there is more than one available option for an effective policy
argument, the advocate must make a choice. To make this
choice, the advocate must consider factors such as the nature of
the facts presented in the case, the temperament of the court
deciding the case, and the political climate. These are similar to
the considerations legal writing professors teach students to
make when deciding which cases to use and which legal
arguments to make when there are multiple options 3
For lawyers to be able to identify the policy argument that
best advances their clients' interests, or to make choices among
such arguments, they must have a solid understanding of what
policy arguments are and how to make them. It is our obligation
as legal writing professionals to teach our students these skills.
Teaching students to make effective policy arguments will serve
both the idealistic goal of improving the quality of persuasive
writing in the practicing bar, as well as the pragmatic goal of
ensuring that lawyers make arguments on issues that affect
judicial decision-making.
Teachers of legal writing should take up the task of
educating students about this important aspect of advocacy. We
should teach policy argumentation as a skill, and teach it
53. NEUMANN, supra note 5, at 121-22; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 280.
2001
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carefully and deliberately. To do this, we not only need to help
students understand the role policy can play in important
cases, 54 but we also need to teach our students about the
different kinds of policy arguments which can be made and how
to effectively support those arguments with authority. The next
sections will address these two topics.
III. EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE AND TYPES OF POLICY
ARGUMENTS
55
While there are several different types of policy arguments,
all policy arguments share the common attribute of advocating
that a proposed legal rule will benefit society by advancing a
particular social goal or, conversely, that the proposed legal rule
will cause harm and should not be adopted. 56 Because a new
rule, or a new application of an existing rule, will have
implications beyond the individual case 57 the appellate court
deciding the case will be concerned with how the rule will work
for future litigants, as well as for society at large.58 Thus, all
policy arguments must involve an assessment of how a proposed
rule will function in the real world.
In constructing a policy argument, the advocate must
attempt to convince the court that the advocated goal is a
desirable one for the client, as well as for society as a whole. 59
The goals underlying most policy arguments are ideals for which
there is general social consensus - ideals such as fairness,
justice, efficiency, and promotion of public health and welfare.60
Identifying the goal is the simplest part of developing a sound
policy argument.
Once the underlying goal is identified, the advocate must
show the court how the proposed rule will help achieve that
54. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
55. While this discussion may be applicable to all kinds of cases, this section
focuses on the use of policy arguments in cases raising a novel issue of law, requiring
either a new rule or new application of an existing rule. See supra notes 6 - 9 and
accompanying text.
56. Edwards, Convergence, supra note 42, at 10.
57. Under the common law method, issues are resolved on a case-by-case basis
with the understanding that law evolves over time. Each case decided then serves as
precedent to guide the court in deciding future controversies of a similar nature. For a
more thorough discussion of the common law method, and the role policy plays under
such a system, see Margolis, supra note 1, at 219-21.
58. Edwards, Convergence, supra note 42, at 10.
59. Id.
60. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1055-60 (reviewing different types of policy arguments).
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goal.61 In this two-step process, it is usually in the second step
that brief-writers fall short. When extracting policy from an
existing source of law, the type of policy-based reasoning
lawyers are generally trained to do,62 an advocate can generally
argue for the application of that reasoning to a new situation. It
is much more difficult, however, to construct this same kind of
policy analysis when it cannot be found in a source of legal
authority.63
There are very few sources containing information about the
nature of different policy arguments. 64 The work of Critical
Legal Studies scholar Duncan Kennedy includes the most
concrete scholarly discussion of types of policy arguments. 65
Professor James Boyle has taken Kennedy's work farther by
providing examples of each type of argument. 66 Very few legal
writing-oriented materials, however, have any description of
different types of policy arguments. 67 It is difficult to divide
policy arguments into firm categories, since there is considerable
overlap between different types of policy arguments. In order to
provide a concrete overview, however, the author has
synthesized the various types of policy arguments into four
broad categories: 1) arguments about judicial administration; 68
2) normative arguments 69; 3) institutional competence
61. Margolis, supra note 1, at 211.
62. See supra notes 5 - 7 and accompanying text.
63. Margolis, supra note 1, at 212.
64. There may be information about different types of policy arguments in some
doctrinal casebooks for courses such as contracts and torts. These discussions are by
nature, however, limited to the particular subject they address, and are not generally
accessible to an individual trying to find information on this subject.
65. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance]; Kennedy,
Freedom and Constraint, supra note 4; KENNEDY, Training for Hierarchy, supra note 4.
66. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1055-60 (describing and providing examples for five
types of policy arguments: judicial administration arguments; institutional competence
arguments; moral arguments; deterrence of social utility arguments; and economic
arguments).
67. The exceptions are SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 198-202 (describing in some
detail four types of policy arguments: normative arguments; economic arguments;
institutional competence arguments; and judicial administration arguments) and
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 19 (describing four types of policy arguments: economic
consequences arguments; administrative efficiency arguments; institutional competence
arguments; and fairness and justice arguments).
68. This category can be subdivided into sub-categories, including firm versus
flexible rule arguments, "floodgates of litigation" arguments, and "slippery slope"
arguments.
69. This category can be subdivided into moral arguments, social utility
arguments, and corrective justice arguments.
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arguments; and, 4) economic arguments. The following sections
will review the most common goals identified in policy
arguments and present the arguments that typically accompany
each goal.
A. Judicial Administration Arguments
First-year law students quickly become familiar with
judicial administration arguments, though they may not be
identified as such. These are the arguments most frequently
identified and discussed in doctrinal courses. Judicial
administration arguments are arguments about how a proposed
rule will affect the workings of the justice system. These are
arguments about the practical administration of the rule by the
courts.7 0 The goal at the heart of these arguments is a fair and
efficient judicial system. There is little dispute that this is a
valuable goal for society.
The dual goals of fairness and efficiency are sometimes at
odds, however. This tension gives rise to the first type of judicial
administration argument, the "firm versus flexible rule"
argument. 71 Proponents of a firm rule argue that a clear,
specific standard will be easy for the court to administer, and
therefore promote efficiency. Further, a firm rule promotes
fairness by leaving little room for judicial discretion, leading to
more consistent application and making it easier for citizens to
understand the rule and act accordingly. On the other hand, a
flexible rule would create confusion, be more prone to judicial
abuse, and undermine the rule of law.7 2 Thus, the "firm rule"
argument attempts to show how both fairness and efficiency are
promoted by adoption of a clear, concise rule.
The "flexible rule" argument, on the other hand, focuses
more heavily on fairness. Proponents of a flexible rule argue
that flexibility allows the court to adapt to changing times, and
to take into account the individual circumstances of each case.
A firm rule, contrarily, would be too harsh and result in
unfairness both in the case before the court and in future cases.
Because a flexible rule will be more responsive and fair,
adopting a flexible rule will promote greater confidence in the
judicial system. 73
70. SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 201.
71. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1056.
72. Id. See also SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 201.
73. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1056; SHAPO ETAL., supra note 5, at 201.
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There are three other judicial administration arguments
that focus primarily on efficiency. These can be made
individually or combined with a firm/flexible rule argument.
The first is the "floodgates of litigation" argument.74 This
argument asserts that a proposed rule, if adopted, will inundate
the court with lawsuits. This may occur because the proposed
rule is confusing, overly broad, or the problem it addresses is
extremely common. According to this argument, the "flood" of
litigation would overwhelm the courts and lead to inefficient use
of the courts' valuable time and resources. 75
The second of these arguments is the "slippery slope"
argument.76  This argument is similar to the "floodgates"
argument, but speaks to fairness as well as efficiency. A
slippery slope argument asserts that if the proposed rule is
adopted, the court will not be able to prevent its application to
an ever broadening set of cases. The rule will be stretched to
one new circumstance after another and, eventually, the court
will be hearing a whole range of cases it never intended to
entertain. This argument may also assert that adoption of the
rule will lead to a large number of frivolous claims. A slippery
slope argument calls on the same efficiency themes as the
"floodgates" argument, but also raises the specter of fairness by
suggesting that it is unfair to open the door to a whole new type
of liability, unexpected by both citizens and the courts.
The final judicial administration argument asserts that a
proposed rule, even if firm, is so complex that it will be
impossible to administer efficiently.7 7 The complexity of the
proposed rule will create unfairness by making it difficult for
citizens to understand and comply with the law. The proposed
rule will also undermine judicial efficiency by requiring a large
number of judicial resources in order to resolve claims under the
rule.
B. Normative Arguments
The next major category of policy arguments is normative
74. This argument is much overused and often used inappropriately. Over the
years, the author has seen many student briefs making "floodgate" arguments because
the students know they should make some kind of policy argument and this is the only
one they can think of. While this argument still has value, it should be used selectively,
and only where truly appropriate.
75. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1056; SHAPOETAL., supra note 5, at 201.
76. SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 201.
77. Id. at 202.
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arguments. Normative arguments assert that a proposed rule
either promotes or undermines shared societal values. Although
there is significant overlap among different types of normative
arguments, they can be roughly broken down into three
categories: moral arguments, social utility arguments, and
corrective justice arguments.78 Normative arguments tend to
appear more "political"79 in nature because, in today's complex
society, there is rarely widespread consensus on issues of
morality or other social good.80 As a result, the goal of a
normative policy argument is not always as obvious or easy to
establish as the goal of a judicial administration argument.
Moral arguments generally assert that a particular rule
should be adopted because it is consistent with generally
accepted moral standards of society. The goal is a system in
which the laws are consistent with, and promote, those moral
values society deems important. For example, in the
psychiatrist duty to warn case, a moral argument would be that
a duty to warn should be adopted because it is immoral for a
psychiatrist to know that his patient is going to kill certain
individuals, yet do nothing to prevent their murders. The goal
at the heart of a moral argument is a society in which we protect
and care for one another, an altruistic view 8l of the world not
shared by all.
Just as judicial administration arguments raise tension
between efficiency and fairness, moral arguments raise tension
between individualism and altruism.8 2  Moral arguments,
therefore, often come in opposing pairs such as "form versus
substance" or "freedom versus security. 8 3 A morality as form
78. Id. at 199. Boyle includes as two separate categories "moral" and "deterrence
of social utility" arguments. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1056-59. The author sees these two
categories as part of the broader "normative" category. Likewise, the "fairness and
justice" sub-division falls into the broad "normative" category. See SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 2, at 19.
79. By political, the author means to suggest that these arguments appear to be
overtly motivated by a particular social agenda or interest group, rather than being
advanced for the good of society as a whole.
80. Classic examples of this can be seen in the legal battles over abortion, gay
rights, and the death penalty. There is no consensus in the United States over whether
abortion should be legal, homosexuals should be given civil rights protection, or
perpetrators of heinous crimes should be put to death. Because these things are not
universally accepted as social goods, normative arguments may not appear as "objective"
as judicial administration arguments.
81. For a more detailed discussion of the role of altruism in the creation of legal
rules, see Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 65, at 1737-38.
82. Id.
83. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1058.
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argument focuses on the "formal" classification of the dispute
and reflects an individualist morality. For example, if a person
of full age and mental capacity enters a contract, he should be
bound by it and keep his bargain. The morality as substance
response would focus on the individuals involved, and reflect an
altruist morality: A large corporation should not be able to
enforce a contract against a poorly educated person with
unequal bargaining power.8 4
In the "freedom versus security" argument, freedom of
action represents the individualist morality. For example, a
doctor should be free to refuse any patient, otherwise the
government is forcing her into a form of servitude; likewise, the
state should only require people to refrain from action, not act
affirmatively. A right to security, on the other hand, reflects an
altruistic morality. For example, a sick person should be
confident that a doctor will treat him because, without this
security, people can benefit from society without fulfilling their
societal obligations*85 There are many variations on this
"individual versus altruist" theme which can make the basis of a
moral policy argument. The key is to determine the world view
that is most beneficial to the advocacy position and develop the
argument accordingly.
The next type of normative argument is the social utility
argument. The advocate of this argument asserts that a
proposed rule will serve a social good and benefit society or,
conversely, will undermine a social value and harm society.8 6
The goal in this type of argument is a society that promotes the
health and well-being of its citizens. The argument asserts that
a proposed rule either deters or encourages conduct that affects
the goal.87 Social utility arguments often intersect with moral
and economic arguments and focus on goals such as public
health, public safety,88 economic health, and national security.
Social utility arguments are particularly useful in tort law
cases in which a court is asked to impose liability and
compensate an individual for harm. 89 For example, in the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1058; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 199.
87. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1058; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 199.
88. For an example of a public safety argument in the psychiatrist duty to warn
case, see supra notes 50 - 51 and accompanying text.
89. Social utility arguments can also be made in cases of first-time statutory
interpretation, in which a court uses policy norms to decide on the application of a
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psychiatrist duty to warn situation, in trying to avoid liability,
the psychiatrist might argue that a rule imposing a duty to warn
would have a negative impact on the public health. Such a duty
could undermine patient confidence in the protection of
confidentiality and cause them to avoid mental health
treatment, resulting in poorer mental health in society at large.
The duty could also cause psychiatrists to commit patients more
frequently to avoid liability, thus restricting the freedom of a
larger number of citizens.
An example of an economic health argument could center
around the need for a flexible standard versus a firm rule. A
flexible standard would allow businesses to adjust to changing
conditions and encourage competition while a firm rule would be
too limiting, confine entrepreneurship, and create an obstacle to
competition. The argument for a firm rule would be that a clear
standard is necessary so that businesses can have predictability
and act with a clear understanding of the law; a flexible
standard would destroy certainty and discourage competition
because businesses will be unsure of the results of their
activities .90
The final normative policy argument is the corrective justice
argument.91 This argument centers on the goal of fairness and
asserts that as between two innocents, the person who caused
the harm should be held responsible. 92  Corrective justice
arguments are most useful in cases in which a court must
determine tort liability. Because corrective justice arguments
focus more directly on the particular parties before the court,
they are generally less useful in cases raising novel issues. In
common law cases of first impression in which the court is being
asked to establish a new cause of action, however, corrective
justice arguments could be very useful. 93 For example, if there
is some precedent in support of a new cause of action, a
corrective justice argument might convince a judge that
imposing liability is the right thing to do.
statute to a new situation. Margolis, supra note 1, at 226 (citing Jane S. Schacter, The
Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 16 (1998).
90. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1058.
91. SHAPOETAL., supra note 5, at 199.
92. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 4, at 534.
93. For a more detailed explanation of the frequency with which state courts are
asked to find new causes of action, see Margolis, supra note 1, at 223-23 (citing Kaye,
supra note 34, at 7).
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C. Institutional Competence Arguments
The third major category of policy arguments are
"institutional competence" arguments.94 These are arguments
about which branch of government 95 is better suited to resolve a
particular legal issue.96 The goal at the heart of institutional
competence arguments is the fair and efficient operation of the
legal system, as well as the maintenance of the constitutional
separation of powers.
While it is generally understood that legislatures create new
law and courts apply the law and resolve disputes, there is a
gray area which makes room for institutional competence
arguments. The gray area is a product of the common law
method used in American legal decision-making, even in cases
involving positive law, such as statutes and constitutions. 97
Under the common law method, judges have the power to fill
gaps in the law and formulate new rules. 98 Thus, judges have a
degree of legislative power, creating the potential for arguments
over whether an issue is better suited for the courts or the
legislature.
Arguments that a controversy is better suited for the courts
focus on the nature of courts as institutions set up to resolve
individual disputes and deal with complex factual issues. These
arguments emphasize the court's ability to respond to changing
circumstances, and its ability to be objective. In addition, the
court has a unique ability to entertain witnesses and make
objective determinations of credibility. Finally, these arguments
emphasize the court's freedom from political constraints faced by
the legislature. Because courts combine all of these abilities, the
legal issue is best resolved by a court.99
Arguments that the legislature is better suited to resolve an
issue focus on similar concerns. These arguments assert that
courts are not competent to resolve an issue because resolution
involves a change in the law, which is solely within the province
of the legislature. According to this argument, the legislature is
94. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 65, at 1752.
95. Most often, the debate is whether the judiciary or the legislature is the most
appropriate branch of government to resolve an issue. It is possible, however, to make an
institutional competence argument involving the executive branch.
96. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1056; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 200.
97. Margolis, supra note 1, at 219.
98. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 65, at 1752; Margolis, supra note 1,
at 197, 220 (citations omitted).
99. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1056-57.
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better able to account for changes in public opinion. Further,
the legislature can hold hearings and gather complex and varied
facts that may not be relevant in the context of litigation.
Accordingly, allowing the court to create law on such an
important issue would threaten the separation of powers. 100
D. Economic Arguments
Economic policy arguments have become more important in
modern legal decision-making as a result of the Law and
Economics movement. 10' Most law students and lawyers should
be at least somewhat familiar with economic policy arguments.
While a lawyer with a background in economics can make very
complex economic policy arguments, 0 2 there are simpler
economic arguments that all law students can learn to make.
Economic arguments place economics, rather than fairness or
justice, at the center of judicial decision-making. 0 3 The goal at
the heart of economic arguments is economic efficiency and
promotion of a free market economy. 04 Economic arguments
can be very persuasive because they give the appearance of
scientific rigor and neutrality, though this appearance often
masks the political choices inherent in the arguments. 10 5
One form of economic argument centers on the allocation of
resources, asserting that a proposed rule should be adopted
because it promotes the most efficient allocation. For example, a
rule might be desirable because it spreads loss over a large
segment of the population. 0 6 On the other hand, a defendant
trying to avoid liability in a products liability suit might argue
that the cost of such liability will be passed on to the public,
ultimately punishing those the rule was designed to benefit.
Another form of economic argument asserts that a cost-
benefit analysis dictates that a proposed rule should be adopted.
Under this analysis, the proponent must show that the potential
100. Id.
101. RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 21-22 (4th ed. 1992)
(asserting that economics in the law has come to the forefront over the last thirty years).
102. For the sake of disclosure, the author wants to make clear that she has very
little background in economics and is incapable of making such complex arguments
herself. While a more thorough understanding of economics would be helpful for a
description of economic policy arguments, it is not necessary for the simple descriptions
contained here.
103. SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 200.
104. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1059-60.
105. Id.
106. SHAPO ETAL., supra note 5, at 200.
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economic benefits created by the rule would outweigh the costs
of implementing it.107 If the benefits do not outweigh the costs,
the rule should not be adopted. The key to a cost-benefit
analysis is determining which factors make up the cost. In
addition to obvious costs, such as the monetary cost of fixing a
defective part, costs such as emotional damage can be factored
in. Including or excluding particular factors can greatly affect
the nature of a cost-benefit policy argument. 08
A third type of economic policy argument is that the
proposed rule will have a positive or negative effect on economic
efficiency and, therefore, affect the operation of the free market
economy. 0 9 The goal at the heart of this argument is to
maintain a legal system that promotes competition and growth
in the economy. A free market argument asserts that a
proposed rule would either promote or inhibit competition, and
should be adopted or rejected on that basis. This argument
obviously overlaps the social utility argument described
above."10
There are, of course, many other types of policy arguments
and many nuances to the arguments categorized above. This
section outlines only the major, and most common, categories of
policy arguments. If legal writing teachers give their students a
solid grounding in these types of arguments, and an
understanding of how policy works in conjunction with legal
arguments, we will be making great strides in improving our
students' abilities to write persuasive briefs. The final challenge
is teaching the students how to effectively support these
arguments with authority.
IV. SUPPORTING POLICY ARGUMENTS WITH PERSUASIVE
AUTHORITY
The biggest problem with policy arguments is that, even
when they are included in legal briefs, they are not generally
supported with authority."' Without support, policy arguments
convey the mushy, "any position can be supported by some
policy, so why should the policy have any impact?" message that
107. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1060.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 200.
110. See supra notes 66, 78, 86-89 and accompanying text.
111. Anecdotal information gathered through numerous conversations with legal
writing professors, judicial clerks, and practicing attorneys.
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causes many to be cynical about the use of policy arguments. 112
There can be little dispute that, to be truly persuasive, policy
arguments must be substantiated." 3 Policy arguments should
be supported with authority just like legal arguments. We
would never teach our students to make a legal argument off-
the-cuff, without any reference to statutes, case law, or other
sources of law that support the argument. Similarly, we should
not encourage students to make policy arguments without
teaching them how to effectively support those arguments.
Each part of the policy argument, the goal and the
explanation of how the proposed rule serves or undermines the
goal, 114 should be supported with authority. Just as identifying
the goal is usually the easiest part of constructing a policy
argument, finding authority that the goal is valid is usually
relatively simple. Because most of the goals are commonly
identified values - judicial efficiency, public health, public
safety, separation of powers, economic efficiency - they have
been identified in cases, statutes and constitutions." 5  For
example, in virtually every jurisdiction, one could find a case
identifying public safety as a valuable social goal and asserting
that the laws should reflect that value. Statutes are also a good
source for policy goals, particularly preambles in which the
legislature sets forth the reasons for enacting a statute or group
of statutes. Even if these statements don't exist in the statutes
themselves, they can often be found in sources of legislative
history. 116
The second step in policy argumentation is showing how the
proposed rule will either achieve or undermine the goal. This is
a much more difficult proposition to support with traditional
sources of legal authority. By definition, a policy argument is
advocating for a new rule or a new application of an existing
rule that has never been implemented. Therefore, it is unlikely
that existing cases or statutes have addressed the effect the rule
will have on the goal. The only likely source of legal authority in
this situation would be cases from other jurisdictions that have
112. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
113. Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a
Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
707, 753 (1996) (pointing out that policy arguments tend to be superficial, and to be
"powerful they would require some empirical or anecdotal substantiation").
114. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
115. See PRATT, supra note 8, at 321-24.
116. Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1983).
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already adopted a similar rule or otherwise addressed a similar
situation. An opinion from one of these cases might have a
discussion of policy which could be cited as a source of
persuasive authority.
If legal materials can't provide adequate support for policy
arguments, then what can? Non-legal materials 117 are often the
best, and sometimes the only support for policy arguments. 118 It
makes sense that legal arguments, which are based on
precedent, should be supported by precedent, while policy
arguments, which are non-precedential, 119 should be supported
by non-precedential, non-legal sources. Policy arguments are
arguments about the effect a legal rule will have, or how it will
operate in the real world. 20 Therefore, facts about the real
world, rather than legal principle, are most appropriate to
support these arguments.
For example, take a situation in which a court is asked to
adopt a proposed rule that holds parents liable when their
children tease other children for being fat. Opponents of the
proposed rule may make a judicial administration argument
that the court will be overwhelmed with litigation on this
subject. The mere assertion of this argument may not persuade
a court that routinely sees the floodgates argument. Why will
there be a flood of litigation? Is this kind of teasing a common
problem? Is a large portion of the population affected by this
problem? A citation to statistical data showing the prevalence of
children teasing other children for being fat, along with citations
to any studies showing the growing number of overweight
children in American society, would greatly enhance the
persuasive value of the argument.
Policy arguments, in predicting the effect a new rule will
have, are by definition future-oriented.' 2' Therefore,
information that aids courts in predicting how people will react
to the rule can be highly persuasive. For example, if a brief
117. Non-legal materials are factual or theoretical information that is not part of
the trial record of the case on appeal. This information can include scientific theory and
data, sociological data, statistical information, economic theory and data, psychological
theory and data, and news of current events. Margolis, supra note 1, at 201 n.27. For a
more detailed analysis of non-legal materials and why they are appropriate to use as
authority in appellate briefs, see id. at 202-19.
118. Id. at 211.
119. Boyle, supra note 4, at 1055.
120. Margolis, supra note 1, at 211-12 (citing Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the
Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988)).
121. Margolis, supra note 1, at 211-12.
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writer is making a social utility argument that a rule should be
adopted because it will encourage socially valuable behavior,
psychological theory might be useful to show how individuals
generally react to similar rules or information. Similarly, an
economic policy argument that a business regulation should be
rejected because it will inhibit competition would be greatly
enhanced by economic theory establishing why a restriction of
that nature would inhibit competition.
Morality arguments can also be made more persuasive by
citing non-legal sources of information. Morality arguments
depend on social consensus about what behavior is acceptable
and what is not. If a litigant is making a morality argument
that a court should establish a new cause of action because it
would be immoral and unjust to let the defendant get away with
the challenged behavior, information confirming a social
consensus on the immorality of the defendant's behavior would
greatly enhance the persuasive value of the argument. This
information could come from statistical data, or even newspaper
articles reporting on current trends.
Used in this way, non-legal materials play the same role as
non-binding, persuasive case authority. 122 In legal writing, we
teach students to use relevant persuasive authority, particularly
when there is no binding authority. 123 We would never tell
students to make an argument without any authority when
there was relevant persuasive authority to support the
argument. In the same way, we should not teach students to
make policy arguments without authority, as long as there is a
source of information that supports the argument. The fact that
support for policy arguments comes from theories or statistics,
rather than cases or statutes, doesn't negate the need to cite
sources to support the argument. Arguments are always
stronger when supported by external sources of information. As
legal writing teachers, we should teach our students that this is
the case even for policy arguments.
Thus, non-legal materials are excellent sources of support
for policy arguments. 124 In addition to providing persuasive
122. Id. at 209.
123. NEUMANN, supra note 5, at 121-22. See also SHAPO ET AL., supra note 5, at 280.
124. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the research issues involved in
using non-legal materials in briefs. For lawyers and students who are not experts in the
other fields, finding reliable information can be a challenge. The internet is obviously a
valuable resource in locating some of this information. For evaluating information, the
work of John Monahan and Laurens Walker is extremely helpful. See, e.g., John
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support, there is another important reason for using non-legal
materials in policy arguments. Judges frequently turn to non-
legal sources of information when faced with novel issues which
require them to formulate new rules of law. 125 Studies show
that in recent years, there has been a marked increase in courts'
citations to non-legal materials. 126 If judges are using this
information, then brief writers should make sure to include it as
part of their arguments.
As legal writing teachers, we would never tell our students
that if a judge is going to read a case anyway, there is no need to
incorporate the case into the arguments in their briefs. Instead,
we urge them to include a detailed discussion of the case so the
judge sees it in the context of the entire argument and
understands how it applies to the controversy before the
court.127 We should do the same with non-legal materials in
support of policy arguments. Lawyers should take an active role
in putting relevant information before the court, rather than
letting judges rely on "common sense," or hoping that the judges
are already aware of the relevant considerations. As long as
courts are using non-legal materials in the creation of new legal
rules, brief writers should take an active role in presenting those
materials to the court in the context of effective policy
arguments. 128
CONCLUSION
Policy arguments are an important, but often overlooked,
part of appellate advocacy and brief writing. As teachers of legal
writing and advocacy, it is time for us to take up the task of
teaching our students to make clear and effective policy
arguments in writing. It is no longer good enough to say "policy
is important and you should support your legal arguments with
policy rationales." We need to give our students clear, detailed
information about the nature and types of policy arguments, as
well as how to support them with persuasive authority. There
are many challenges associated with teaching this subject. We
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing
Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
125. Margolis, supra note 1, at 206.
126. Id. at 207 (citing Frederick Schauer & Virginia Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal
Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 & app. (1997)).
127. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING, supra note 5, at 307; See also NEUMANN, supra
note 5, at 276-77.
128. Margolis, supra note 1, at 210.
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need to learn more about policy arguments ourselves. 129 We
need to think about how policy arguments should be structured,
and how to effectively research non-legal materials. Much more
work can be done to determine what kind of information
provides the best support for different types of policy arguments.
Finally, this is one more thing to teach in programs that already
contain too much work for too little credit. In spite of the
challenges, however, policy arguments are important, and the
time has come to devote more attention to them.
129. This work is really just a beginning at understanding policy arguments and
how they can be used in appellate briefs. There are many more issues to be explored as
we learn more about writing and teaching these often complex arguments. See id. at
235-36.
Vol. 62
26
Montana Law Review, Vol. 62 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/2
